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Summary: The higher education sectors of European countries have 
been subjected to an unprecedented amount of reforms over the past 
decade. Much of these changes are the consequence of the Bologna 
Process, which introduces a common Bachelor-Master-Doctorate 
system in the participating countries, with a view to increasing the 
employability of the European citizen and the international competi-
tiveness of Europe as a whole. Apart from the Bologna Process, the 
important EU policy project called the Lisbon Strategy clearly affects 
higher education policy, as its goal is to establish the world’s most 
competitive knowledge economy. ‘Lisbon’ and ‘Bologna’ increasingly 
converge, particularly via the Open Method of Coordination, which is 
not surprising considering that they are both part of the same momen-
tum. This momentum seems to regard education almost exclusively as 
an economic commodity, and it could therefore be argued that both po-
licy projects contribute to a commercialisation of higher education. The 
desirability of this development is questionable, and the fact that both 
Bologna and Lisbon suffer from serious democratic defects indicates 
that much needed public-wide discussions are lacking.
        
Introduction
Education serves to pass on society’s values to the children of the 
nation and is employed by the state to make ‘good citizens’.1 The choice 
of the values that a society decides to transmit to its future members 
is intrinsically connected to national identity. Therefore, ‘deeply rooted 
in local, regional and national culture, education takes different forms 
in each country reflecting the different expectations of our societies’.2 
1 See D Ravitch & J Viteritti, Making Good Citizens, Education and Civil Society (Yale Uni-
versity Press, New Haven  2001).
2 As stated by M Marin, member of the European Commission, in a European Parliament 
debate on encouraging teacher mobility. Debates of the European Parliament (24 October 
1986) OJ Annex No 2-344/275, 281. See also J Handoll, ‘Foreign Teachers and Public 
Education’ in B de Witte (ed), European Community Law of Education (Nomos Verlagsgese-
llschaft, Baden-Baden 1989) 31, 31.
*  This paper is largely  based on the PhD research of the author, forthcoming as S Garben, 
EU Higher Education Law. The Bologna Process and Harmonization by Stealth (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague 2011).
**  Administrator, Research and Documentation Centre, Court of Justice of the EU. All 
views expressed in this contribution are strictly personal.
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Going to the core of state sovereignty, education is a firmly establis-
hed competence of the nation state.3 As Leuze and others note,4 educa-
tion has become a ‘normative good’5 of the modern state, and it is this 
state that prominently decides on the structural set-up of the education 
systems, arranges the financing of education for its citizens and is held 
accountable for the achievements, as well as the failures. It is natural 
for the state to defend its position as the decider, internally as well as 
externally. In an EU context, the foregoing finds reflection in what is now 
art 165 TFEU. This provision, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, does 
acknowledge a role for the EU in educational matters, but limits this 
role to a complementary and subsidiary one to that of the Member Sta-
tes. The national educational autonomy paradigm, laid down in the first 
paragraph, is not even the most restrictive aspect of the provision. The 
prohibition of harmonisation enshrined in paragraph 4 constitutes the 
first explicit negative limitation of competence in the history of European 
law, which the Maastricht Treaty introduced together with similar prohi-
bitions in the fields of culture and health. 
Art 126 of the EC Treaty (now art 165 TFEU) can be seen as an 
attempt of the Member States to draw clear lines in the sand, or to ‘clip 
the wings’ of the EC.6 In the preceding years, the Community had ma-
naged to create law and policy in the area of education, facilitated in no 
small manner by extensive interpretations of the Treaty by the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). Claims of students arguing unfair treatment in 
other Member States met with an understanding ECJ, which granted 
them the right to study abroad and – in principle – to receive the same 
treatment as nationals, even though this was not explicitly provided by 
the Treaty. The Court’s extensive interpretation of what constituted ‘voca-
tional training’ also allowed the European Commission to launch its am-
bitious ERASMUS programme, which to date has allowed over 1.5 million 
students to benefit from a period of study in a Member State other than 
3 E Young, ‘Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary 
Tales From American Federalism’ (2002) 77 New York University Law Review, Vol. 77, 2002, 
1670-1677.
4 K Leuze and others, ‘Transformations of the State’ (2008) TranState Working Paper, Bre-
men No 72/2008 1.  
5 A Hurrelmann and others, ‘The Golden-Age Nation State and its Transformation: A 
Framework for Analysis’ in A Hurrelmann, S Leibfried, K Martens, & P Mayer (eds), Trans-
forming the Golden-Age Nation State (Palgrave Macmillan,  Houndmills, Basingstoke 2007) 
3.
6 See J Lonbay, ‘Reflections on Education and Culture in EC Law’ in: R Craufurd Smith 
(ed), Culture and European Union Law (OUP 2004) 244. See also M Dougan, ‘Fees, Grants, 
Loans and Dole Cheques: Who Covers the Cost of Migrant Education within the EU?’ (2005) 
32 CML Rev 949; J Shaw, ‘From the Margins to the Centre: Education and Training Law 
and Policy’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP 1999); and G. 
Gori, Towards an EU Right to Education, (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001).
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their own.7 Although an education dimension was never absent from the 
Treaty, for even its oldest form contained provisions enabling the adopti-
on of measures for the mutual recognition of diplomas8 and in the area of 
vocational training,9 these developments are generally regarded to have 
taken place in the absence of a real Treaty base, and are therefore often 
criticised. Murphy, for example, states that:
the fuzzy, blurred, and covert history of education policy in Europe 
does not contribute much to a sense of optimism regarding the stren-
gthening of European democratic legitimacy, a key and indispensable 
component of any effective post-national form of citizenship.10 
Art 126 of the EC Treaty (now art 165 TFEU) codified the existing prac-
tice, thereby providing the Community with explicit legitimacy for the de 
facto policy that had come into existence, while at the same time establis-
hing clearly that that was as far as it should go.11 
The European Court of Justice and national educational autonomy
Nevertheless, it appears that the ECJ has not seized its judicial ac-
tivism in this area since Maastricht, as it has continued to hand down 
controversial judgments, qualifying ‘privately funded’ education as a ‘ser-
vice’ within the meaning of the Treaty,12 demanding equal treatment of 
foreign EU students even with regard to maintenance grants13 and conde-
mning legislation aimed at combating the flooding of faculties by foreign 
students that seek to escape national numerous clauses regimes.14 In this 
light, it is not all that surprising to find national politicians on occasion 
pitted against the ECJ. The Court has made it abundantly clear that edu-
7 Case 242/87 Commission v Council (ERASMUS) [1989] ECR 1425. On the ERASMUS 
case, see Lenaerts, ‘ERASMUS: Legal Basis and Implementation” in de Witte (n 2). For 
facts and figures on the ERASMUS exchange programme, see European Commission, The 
History of European Cooperation in Education and Training: An Example of Europe in the 
Making (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg  2006).
8 Art 57 EEC (now art 47 EC).
9 Art 128 EEC (now art 150 EC).
10 M Murphy, ‘Covert Action? Education, Social Policy and Law in the European Union’ 
(2003) 18 (5) Journal of Education Policy 560.
11 See M Verbruggen, ‘Tussen Subsidiariteit en Harmonisatie: Een onderzoek naar de in-
strumenten voor het voeren van een Europees onderwijsbeleid’ (PhD Thesis, Catholic Uni-
versity of Leuven, 2001) 15.  
12 Case C-76/05 Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz v Finanzamt Bergisch Gladbach [2007] ECR 
I-6849.
13 Case C-209/03 The Queen, on the application of Dany Bidar v London Borough of Ealing 
and Secretary of State for Education and Skills [2005] ECR I-2119.
14 Case C-147/03 Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Austria [2005] 
ECR I-5969. See S Garben, ‘Case C-73/08 Nicolas Bressol and Others, Celine Chaverot and 
Others v Gouvernement de la Communauté française, Judgment of the Court (Grand Cham-
ber) of 13 April 2010, nyr’ (2010) 47 CML Rev 1493 - 1510.
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cation is not an area outside the scope of the Treaty, and that it can be 
deeply affected by the application of internal market freedoms as well as 
EU legislation. Even in 1974, the Court stated that:
although educational and training policy is not as such included in 
the spheres which the Treaty has entrusted to the Community Insti-
tutions, it does not follow that the exercise of powers transferred to 
the Community is in some way limited if it is of such a nature as to 
affect the measures taken in the execution of a policy such as that of 
education and training.15 
Subsequently, the ECJ interpreted vocational training so as to include an 
element of ‘general education’ in its important Gravier judgment,16 which it 
further developed in the Blaizot case,17 clarifying that university education 
could also qualify as vocational training, as long as the course was inten-
ded to prepare the student for an occupation. As was mentioned above, 
this was a prelude to the Court’s controversial erasmus judgment, in which 
it interpreted that same provision so as to provide for sufficient legal com-
petence to support a far-reaching student exchange programme.18 
Apart from the ECJ’s extensive interpretation of EU competences, 
its consistent practice to apply the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty 
unrestrictedly in the area of education is of considerable consequence. 
Firstly, teachers, as they perform ‘services of some economic value for 
and under the direction of another person’ in return for which they recei-
ve remuneration, qualify as ‘workers’ within the meaning of art 45 TFEU 
(ex art 39 EC).19 The ECJ has confirmed in numerous cases that the te-
aching profession does not fall within the public service exception of art 
45(4) TFEU (ex art 39(4) EC), even though teachers might have to take 
decisions as prescribed by national public law, such as awarding marks 
and deciding whether a pupil can move to a higher class.20 Secondly, the 
educational institution also derives rights from European law.21 Under 
certain conditions, the institution can qualify as a service provider within 
15 Case 9/74 Donato Casagrande v Landeshauptstadt München [1974] ECR 773.
16 Case 293/83 Gravier [1985] ECR 593.
17 Case 24/86 Blaizot v. University of Liege [1988] ECR 379.
18 Case 242/87 Commission v. Council (Erasmus) [1989] ECR 1425.
19 Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Wuertemberg [1986] ECR 2121. See on this topic 
Handoll (n 2) 31-50.
20 It does not matter whether it concerns a secondary school teacher, a foreign language 
assistant at a university, a university teacher or even a trainee teacher, in principle they 
are all entitled to benefit from the rights attached to worker status. See Cases C-4/91 Anne-
gret Bleis v Ministère de l’Education Nationale [1991] ECR I-5627; C-33/88 Pilar Allué and 
Carmel Mary Coonan v Università degli studi di Venezia [1989] ECR 1591; and C-290/94, 
Commission v Greece [1996] ECR I-3285.
21 See on this topic W Skouris, ‘La Liberté d’établissement et de prestation de services en 
matière d’enseignement’ in de Witte (n 2) 21-29.
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the meaning of art 56 TFEU (ex art 49 EC), and it also benefits from the 
freedom of establishment as provided by art 49 TFEU (ex art 43 EC).22 This 
allows foreign educational institutions to penetrate the ‘education mar-
ket’ of other Member States, by offering courses, concluding cooperati-
on agreements with national institutions, by opening subsidiaries and in 
many other ways. This might cause concerns about governmental control 
over the organisation, content and quality of the higher education offered 
on their territory, and potentially stands in tense relation with art 165(1) 
EC. Thirdly, students enjoy the right to freedom of movement and equal 
treatment, sometimes derived from their worker status, sometimes being 
children of workers, and sometimes simply by virtue of their studies pre-
paring them to be a worker, strengthened by their European citizenship. 
This especially has proven to be a controversial matter. Member States are 
hesitant to accept the full equal treatment of students, especially those 
who are not economically active. It could be questioned whether foreign 
students should receive on an equal basis all the educational facilities, 
services and even grants made available by the host state to its nationals, 
without having contributed to the welfare system of that state.
To a certain extent, the approach of the Court is based on sound 
logic. After all, the EU has been endowed with a number of functional 
powers to achieve certain policy objectives, such as the creation of the 
common market and therein the free movement of persons, which may 
require changes in all kinds of sectors, including education.23 It is the-
refore nothing less than logical that many policy fields that were initially 
not intended to be EU business can be and have been affected in the 
slipstream of the implementation of these functional powers, even in the 
absence of explicit legal competence.24 It is, however, remarkable that 
the Court attaches so little value to the national autonomy principle as 
laid down in art 165(1) TFEU, even more so because it has done much to 
give legal significance to the second paragraph of that very same provi-
sion, in order to broaden the scope of EU influence. In the Jundt case,25 
the ECJ condemned a German law denying a German national a tax 
concession for university teaching, because the teaching took place in 
another Member State. This was held to be a restriction of the freedom to 
provide services as laid down in art 56 TFEU (ex art 49 EC). In answering 
the question whether this restriction could be justified, the Court used 
the objectives of art 165(2) TFEU, in particular the promotion of teacher 
and student mobility, to reject the argument of the German Government 
22 Case C-153/02 Valentina Neri v European School of Economics [2003] I-13555.
23 B de Witte, ‘Introduction’ in de Witte (n 2) 10.
24 B de Witte, ‘The Scope of Community Powers in the Field of Education and Culture in the 
Light of Subsequent Practice’ in  R Bieber & G Ress (eds), The Dynamics of EC-Law (Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1987) 236.
25 Case C-281/06 Jundt v Finanzambt [2007] ECR I-0000.
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that the national legislation was justified by the promotion of teaching, 
research and development as an overriding reason in the public interest, 
while ignoring the first paragraph of the same provision. In weighing the 
interest of the German government in shaping its education policy aga-
inst the EU educational objectives (of teacher mobility), the Court gave 
full preference to the latter. 
Indeed, Member States are granted only a very limited amount of 
leeway in the implementation of their education policy whenever it to-
uches upon internal market freedoms, which helps to explain the incre-
asing criticism of politicians directed at the ECJ. The Belgian-Austrian 
Education Saga26 provides an interesting example in this context. Belgi-
um and Austria are both relatively small countries with large neighbours 
in which the same or a similar language is spoken and both had a very 
open and unrestricted higher education access policy in comparison with 
those neighbouring countries. This situation led to a high influx of French 
and German students, especially in the area of medical studies, which 
they sought to restrict in order to prevent the overburdening of their edu-
cation systems and to prevent a shortage of medical professionals in the 
long run, expecting the foreign students to return ‘home’ after their stu-
dies. The Court declared the legislation in question, limiting the access of 
foreign students to those who could prove that they were admitted to the 
same kind of study in their Home State, to be incompatible with EC law. 
The judgment caused considerable uproar in Austria and beyond, with 
Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel expressing fierce criticism directed at the 
Court. According to the Chancellor, the Court should have borne in mind 
that education was a policy area reserved for the national government.27 
He told the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung: 
in recent years […] the ECJ has systematically expanded European 
competencies, even in areas where there is decidedly no Commu-
nity law. Suddenly judgments emerge on the role of women in the 
German federal army, or on access of foreign students to Austrian 
colleges – that is clearly national law.28 
He was supported by other politicians, such as the Danish Prime Mini-
ster Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who declared to Der Standard that: 
26 Case C-65/03 Commission v Belgium [2004] ECR I-6427; Case C-147/03 Commission of 
the European Communities v Republic of Austria [2005] ECR I-5969. See Garben (n 14).
27 G Parker, ‘Austrian chancellor urges EU court to heed national feelings’ Financial Times 
(London 20 April 2006).
28 Interview mit dem künftigen Ratspräsidenten der EU, ‘300 Sprachen und 500 Dialekte - 
das ist mein Europa‘, Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich 13 December 2005). See also P Belien, 
‘Austria and Denmark Fear American-Style Supreme Court’ The Brussels Journal (13 Janu-
ary 2006). 
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We all easily have the feeling that there [at the ECJ], decisions are 
being taken of which the basis of the judgments do not fully corres-
pond with what we have agreed as the political basis of the deve-
lopment of the EU.29
Arguably, these political overstatements do not reflect an entirely 
correct analysis of European law, but it cannot be denied that the overall 
tone of art 165 TFEU is one demanding respect for national autonomy 
and diversity in educational affairs, which seems to be ignored by the 
Court. Responsibility and powers relating to the content and organisation 
of educational systems lie primarily with the Member States, leaving the 
EU with the secondary role of facilitating and encouraging cooperation 
and mobility. This is an important paradigm, and the argument that it 
should not be hollowed out by overly extensive interpretation of internal 
market powers and the rights that citizens derive from the fundamental 
freedoms, especially by a too rigid application of the proportionality test, 
is a fair one. Indeed, the impact of the Court’s case law is substantial. In 
some instances, it puts the Member States to great expense and in other 
instances it curbs their policy discretion. Even more so considering the 
‘snowball’ dynamics of European integration, which means that negative 
integration often needs to be accompanied by positive integration in the 
form of co-ordinating or harmonising legislation. When national legislati-
on is condemned for incompatibility with European law, its inapplicabi-
lity leaves a gap, triggering the need for a European solution. This raises 
the question about what should happen if there is no legislative compe-
tence in the field in question. According to Handoll: 
one could indeed argue that, where the Court has recognised the in-
trusiveness of ‘functional’ rules of free movement and non-discrimi-
nation into areas of national competence, the Community will have to 
be competent to take positive action to resolve resulting difficulties.30 
This feeds back into the first strand of the ECJ’s judicial activity in edu-
cation: strengthening the EU’s competence so as to allow it to enact legi-
slation in this area.
This is not to say that it is undesirable to encourage EU co-ordina-
tion of educational policies. In many cases, co-operation is the key to a 
host of problems. For example, one could argue that a European arran-
gement dealing with ‘who pays what for mobile students’ is necessary 
to solve the problem of potential double entitlements to study funding. 
In the Morgan and Bucher31 cases, dealing with the question of to what 
extent Member States should allow for the ‘exportability’ of maintenance 
29 EUObserver.com at http://euobserver.com/9/20666 accessed on 30 November 2010.
30 Handoll (n 2) 36.
31 Joined Cases C-11/06 and C-12/06 Morgan and Bucher [2007] ECR I-9161.
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grants, Austria, Sweden, the UK and the European Commission argued 
that forcing Member States to award grants to resident students going 
abroad to study was undesirable considering the risk of duplication of 
entitlements, caused by the absence of co-ordinating provisions betwe-
en the Member States in relation to student support. Indeed, it turned 
out that apart from the German funds she claimed, Ms Morgan received 
from the United Kingdom authorities financial support in the form of 
an allowance for tuition fees and maintenance costs, as well as a loan. 
Although EU law seems to favour a system in which the host state pays 
for the mobile student, a common system of exportability, cancelling this 
obligation of the host country, seems to find favour with several aut-
horitative commentators. They argue that it is preferable to impose the 
burden of providing students with financial aid on the home state.32 The 
amount of financial support for studies abroad could be pegged to the 
amount for studies in the home state, making the exportation of student 
support ‘financially neutral to the treasury, to the extent that the latter 
need not subsidise the more expensive tuition and subsistence costs po-
tentially incurred in other Member States’.33 This approach would mimic 
that adopted in the area of health care, where the state is only obliged to 
compensate for treatment abroad up to the level of expenses that would 
be reimbursed for the same treatment at home.34 Van der Mei points 
out that it is in that home state that students or their parents have paid 
taxes, thereby contributing to the financing of education and grant sche-
mes, and it is that state which will benefit from the acquired skills and 
knowledge of the students.35 
At the end of the day, the decision whether to have the host states 
provide funding to the guest student on an equal basis to nationals or to 
have home states pay for their mobile nationals is a policy choice that, 
within an EU context, the European legislature should make. Although 
Member States might not be keen on seeking a solution within the EU 
framework, ever suspicious of a Commission power-grab in educational 
affairs, this is one of the areas where such co-operation might really pay 
off. However, not in all situations is harmonisation a desirable answer. 
32 A Van Der Mei, ‘Freedom of Movement for Students: In Search of a More Satisfactory 
Balance between the Goal to Promote Student Mobility and the Need to Protect Educati-
on Systems’ in  H Schneider (ed), Migration, Integration and Citizenship: A Challenge for 
Europe’s Future, vol I (Forum Maastricht, Maastricht 2005). G Davies, ‘The Process and 
Side-Effects of Harmonisation of European Welfare States (2006) Jean Monnet Working 
Paper 02/06, 24-25. See also G Davies, ‘Higher Education, Equal Access, and Residence 
Conditions: Does EU Law Allow Member States to Charge Higher Fees to Students not Pre-
viously Resident?’ (2005) 12 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 227, 
and G Davies, ‘Any Place I Hang my Hat, or: Residence is the New Nationality’ (2005) 11 (1) 
European Law Journal 43.
33 Dougan (n 6).
34 Van Der Mei (n 32).
35 Van Der Mei (n 32).
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When Advocate General Sharpston in her Opinion in the Bressol case, 
which concerns the claim of French students against the newly imposed 
Belgian legislation restricting migrant students access to certain studies, 
argued that the Belgian legislation dealing with its universities overbur-
dened by French students was in breach of EU law, she might have been 
too quick to brush away Belgium’s problems by presenting harmonisati-
on as the solution.36 After rejecting all the justifications brought forward 
by the Belgian Government, she invited the European legislature to start 
to consider its legislative options on the matter. Although it triggers an 
interesting debate on the scope of EU competence in the area of higher 
education, to present harmonisation as the solution in this particular 
case not only testifies to a certain amount of insensitivity, but it also 
fails to offer a really viable alternative. What kind of measure would deal 
with the French/Belgian and German/Austrian problems in a satisfac-
tory manner: harmonisation of entry requirements for certain studies all 
over Europe? What would be the content of those requirements? A Eu-
ropean-level imposed numerus clausus system for selected studies? Or a 
European-level imposed ‘free access without charge’ regime? Although it 
is perhaps not impossible to find some kind of acceptable system, the fact 
that Member States would be forced to accept such as the only solution 
severely impinges on their freedom to organise higher education in the 
way they see fit.37
Member States Europeanising higher education: Bologna and Lisbon
Notwithstanding the legitimate criticism of the ECJ’s somewhat in-
trusive approach, it should be accepted that European law sometimes 
affects national policy, including education policy, in a way not planned 
by the national legislature. The EU has been endowed with functional 
powers, which are necessary in the creation of an internal market. It is 
neither realistic nor constructive to argue that certain policy areas sho-
uld be removed from the scope of potential EU influence, since the (exer-
cise of the) functional powers will by nature cut horizontally across all 
policy fields, at least to a certain extent. Moreover, the wailing cries of the 
politicians are often more crocodile tears than anything else. Obviously it 
is not just the ECJ that is responsible for all the educational integration 
of the past years. It is the Member States themselves that have played 
the most important role in the increased Europeanisation of education, 
both in and outside their Council capacity, in recent years most notably 
in the intergovernmental arena of the Bologna Process. To be regarded as 
36  Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 25 June 2009 in Case C-73/08 
Nicolas Bressol and Others and Céline Chaverot and Others v Gouvernement de la Commu-
nauté française.
37 See Garben (n 14) 1505.
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both the product and the continuation of a series of European conferen-
ces and a certain number of policy decisions,38 the Bologna Process has 
as its aim the creation of a so-called European Higher Education Area 
by 2010. To this end, the signatories have agreed to reform their higher 
education systems so as to bring them in line with each other, in other 
words to harmonise them. The core feature of the Bologna Process is the 
introduction of a common Bachelor-Master-Doctorate system. This revo-
lutionary enterprise was set in motion quite suddenly. It was initiated in 
1998, when at an international Forum organised in connection with the 
celebration of the 800th anniversary of the Sorbonne University, the Mi-
nisters of Education of France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom 
decided on a ‘Joint Declaration on harmonisation of the architecture of 
the European higher education system’. It was open for the other Member 
States of the European Union (EU), as well as for third countries, to join. 
The Italian Minister for Education extended an invitation to fellow Mini-
sters in other European countries to a follow-up conference, which was 
to take place in Bologna the following year.39 This conference indeed took 
place, in June 1999, and it was on this occasion that no fewer than 29 
European countries agreed on a Declaration that would fundamentally 
influence the future of their higher education systems.40   
Reading the actual text of the Bologna Declaration, one cannot but be 
struck by the ambitious language it employs. The Declaration commen-
ces with the statement that: ‘the European process, thanks to the extra-
ordinary achievements of the last few years, has become an increasingly 
concrete and relevant reality for the Union and its citizens’ and continues 
to say that:
we are witnessing a growing awareness in large parts of the political 
and academic world and in public opinion of the need to establish a 
more complete and far-reaching Europe, in particular building upon 
and strengthening its intellectual, cultural social and scientific and 
technological dimensions. 
It seems difficult to imagine that these phrases stem from the same co-
untries that have been keen on keeping higher education safely in the 
hands of the nation state. Furthermore, the meaning of these phrases 
becomes quite ambiguous upon realising that the Bologna enterprise is 
taking place outside the framework of the EU. While in words praising 
the achievements of the EU in the process of European integration and 
38 Eurydice (2003) ‘Focus on the Structure of Higher Education in Europe. National Trends 
in the Bologna Process 2003/04’.
39 E Hackl, ‘Towards a European Area of Higher Education: Change and Convergence in 
European Higher Education’ (2001) EUI Working Paper RSC No 2001/09 21.
40 This is known as the ‘Bologna Declaration’. Currently 46 countries take part in the pro-
cess. 
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explicitly referring to the ‘Union and its citizens’ and the aim of ‘conso-
lidating European citizenship’, the Declaration is in fact nothing more 
than a soft-law instrument which envisages practically no involvement of 
the EU. Its intergovernmental character, in addition to its extended mem-
bership that currently enables 20 non-Member States to take part, places 
the Bologna Process outside the EU’s formal policy-making process.41 
Hackl points out that the developments concerning the Bologna Process 
seem to contradict the ‘traditional resistance of the EU Member States 
to any harmonisation policy in education and to increased Community 
competences’.42  It is true that the pro-European integration wording and 
tone of the Bologna Declaration are in that respect remarkable. However, 
the fact that the Member States decided to tackle higher education issues 
in an intergovernmental manner actually illustrates their resistance to 
EU involvement and their desire to remain fully sovereign. 
The tense relationship between the EU and the Bologna Process 
notwithstanding, the latter constitutes a catalyst for the promotion of 
student mobility and increased involvement in higher education not only 
outside but also within an EU context. Firstly, it is likely to strengthen 
the Court in its pro-student mobility approach. In Advocate General 
Sharpston’s opinion to the follow-up Belgian Education Case, mentioned 
above, the Bologna Process was indeed used to help set the scene for her 
progressive opinion.43 Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer also invo-
ked the Bologna Process in order to build up his argument for increased 
student mobility in his opinion to the Morgan and Bucher cases.44 Further-
more, Bologna has allowed the Commission to gain influence within an 
EU context, mainly by - in reaction to the Bologna Process - developing 
‘its higher education discourse as a key for the Europe of knowledge’.45 
The Commission has been able to do this because many of the ideas of 
the Bologna Process have found clear correspondence with European Co-
uncil documents, most importantly the Lisbon Council Conclusions, and 
consequently it has seen its political mandate in the higher education 
sector expanded. According to Keeling, ‘the Commission’s dynamic asso-
ciation of the Bologna university reforms with its Lisbon research agenda 
and its successful appropriation of these as European-level issues have 
placed its perspectives firmly at the heart of higher education policy de-
41 R Keeling, ‘The Bologna Process and the Lisbon Research Agenda: The European Com-
mission’s Expanding Role in Higher Education Discourse (2006) 41 (2) European Journal of 
Education 207.
42 Hackl (n 39) 2.
43 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston (n 36) para 1.
44 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Morgan and Bucher (n 31) paras 45-46. 
45 P Ravinet, ‘From Voluntary Participation to Monitored Coordination: Why European 
Countries Feel Increasingly Bound by their Commitment to the Bologna Process, (2008) 43 
(3) European Journal of Education 357. 
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bates in Europe’.46 The Lisbon European Council was not a one-off event, 
and the goal to become a European knowledge economy has been firmly 
placed on the European agenda ever since. Two years after the Lisbon 
Council, in Barcelona, the European Council made even clearer referen-
ce to the emerging common area of higher education, calling for further 
action to ‘introduce instruments to ensure the transparency of diplomas 
and qualifications (ects, diploma and certificate supplements, European 
cv) and closer co-operation with regard to university degrees’.47 
The most obvious example of this increased mandate of the Commi-
ssion to act within the EU framework is the introduction by the Lisbon 
Strategy of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in education. The 
Commission plays a central role in the OMC, and is now in a position to 
set overarching goals for the European higher education sector. These 
are not legally binding, but it does boost the Commission’s political power 
in this field. The Commission can influence the direction in which the 
European higher education sector(s) will develop and evolve, and that is 
quite a powerful position in a policy area where the Member States had 
always been particularly suspicious of the Commission and have done 
their utmost to tie the Commission’s hands. Nevertheless, although it is 
true that the Commission has thus been able to affirm its role in higher 
education matters within the EU context as a consequence of the Lisbon 
Strategy, and has used the increased interest in achieving a knowledge 
economy to advocate its aims and programmes in higher education, it 
seems that this is more a natural consequence of the momentum behind 
both the Bologna Process and the Lisbon Strategy than deliberate tactics 
of the Commission. It was the European Council that shortly after the 
Bologna Declaration lifted the latter’s overarching philosophy to a higher 
level, in making it part of Europe’s most important strategic objective. As 
Kahn put it: 
two years before the European Council of Lisbon, the Sorbonne and 
Bologna Declarations foreshadowed the EU’s well known ‘strategic 
goal for the next decade: to become the most competitive and dyna-
mic knowledge-based economy in the world’.48 
The fact that the Member States allow the Commission to take this front 
seat can probably be explained by the explicitly intergovernmental, flexi-
ble and ‘soft’ nature of this co-operation. Arguably, the Member States 
feel safe enough seeing that their participation is entirely voluntary and 
46 Keeling (n 41) 203.
47 See P Zgaga, ‘The Bologna Process: From Prague to Berlin and After’ (paper on the basis 
of author’s engagement in the Bologna follow-up group as rapporteur for the Berlin confe-
rence in September 2003). 
48 S Kahn, ‘The European Higher Education Area at the Crossroads’ (2002) 2 Revue en 
ligne ‘Etudes Européennes’ < http://www.etudes-europeennes.fr> accessed in 2009. 
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that, as such, they have ultimate leverage over the Commission if it deci-
des to take matters in an unwanted direction. Furthermore, it is proba-
bly not inconvenient to the Member States either to have an expert and 
well-equipped organiser at the table, who can incidentally also function 
as a ‘scapegoat’ or ‘lightning conductor’ if the formulated policies prove 
unpopular in the national arena.
The momentum of which the Lisbon Strategy within the EU and the 
ever-developing Bologna Process outside the EU are part causes them 
to increasingly converge. Considering that many of the goals and ide-
as expressed in the context of the Lisbon Strategy concur with the ove-
rarching philosophy, as well as with the concrete aims of the Bologna 
Process, this convergence is not surprising. The OMC plays a key role 
in this merging ‘into one policy framework’.49 Most of the elements or 
characteristics of the OMC, eg setting timetables, establishing indicators 
and benchmarks and operating accordingly, setting specific targets and 
periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review, can now also be found 
in the activities around the Bologna Process. Some even claim that the 
Bologna Process is now considered to be part of the Open Method of Co-
ordination.50 Since Berlin 2003, the Commission co-ordinates monthly 
‘Bologna seminars’, which seek to push forward the spread of best prac-
tice through the OMC.51 The European Network of Quality Assurance 
Agencies (ENQAA) plays an important role in the implementation of the 
Bologna Declaration. As Furlong notes, the ENQAA is a typical OMC in-
stitution in its structure and operations, set up and supported by the 
European Commission. In Berlin, this institution was mandated to deve-
lop standards, procedures and guidelines on quality assurance. Bologna 
has, however, up until now, not been formally incorporated in the EU 
framework. Therefore, it cannot be called a part of the OMC, or the Lisbon 
Process, as such. Rather, it is seen that the activities of the Commission 
in the framework of Bologna are considered to be part of the OMC, or the 
Lisbon Process. The Commission itself formulates it as follows: 
The Lisbon Strategy encompasses the Commission’s contribution to 
the intergovernmental Bologna Process, aiming to establish a Eu-
ropean Higher Education Area by 2010, mainly in the areas of cu-
rricular reform and quality assurance. The Bologna process coinci-
des with Commission policy in higher education supported through 
European programmes and notably Socrates-Erasmus, Tempus and 
Erasmus Mundus. The Commission stimulates Bologna initiatives 
49 J Huisman & M van de Wende, ‘The EU and Bologna: Are Supra- and International Initia-
tives Threatening Domestic Agendas? (2004) 39 (3) European Journal of Education 34–35.
50 Lonbay (n 6) 253. 
51 P Furlong, ‘British Higher Education and the Bologna Process: An Interim Assessment’ 
(2005) 25 (1) Politics 55. 
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at European level and participates as a full member in the Bologna 
Follow-up Group and the Bologna Board.
The focus of much of the research in this area is on the European 
Commission as a policy actor in the higher education sector, which is un-
derstandable because of its importance as well as its fascinatingly difficult 
position. But it should not be forgotten that the EU Member States are 
the main driving forces behind the reform movement sweeping European 
higher education, in their capacity as the Council and in Bologna’s inter-
governmental arena. The states seem keen to pursue the related objec-
tives in several political contexts, both inside and outside the EU. It is 
not entirely clear why, and whether, they would be in favour of increased 
convergence. It is most likely that, if given the choice, they would prefer 
to keep Bologna separate from the EU framework. But at the same time 
they do benefit from an increased convergence, or rather profusion, of 
Bologna and the Lisbon Strategy. Apart from the objective aims to achieve 
in European higher education, the national political actors are suspected 
of having embarked on the Bologna Process for more subjective reasons. 
Many political scientists have reported on the ‘two-level game’ that was 
played by the main political actors of Bologna.52 As argued by Moravcsik, 
international co-operation redistributes domestic power in favour of na-
tional executives by permitting them to loosen domestic constraints im-
posed by legislatures, interest groups, and other societal actors.53 The 
Bologna Process has been described as a ‘red herring’, which the national 
governments use for their own domestic purposes.54 Kahn notes:
it is a highly convenient pretext for nations to evade the responsibi-
lity for structural reforms, always necessary and suddenly indispen-
sable because of an abstract and disembodied European constraint. 
If they cannot lay the blame for the constraint on some little ‘bureau’ 
in Brussels or elsewhere – there isn’t one – they can always plead the 
fulfilment of undertakings to their partners: they must follow their 
partners’ example or will lose ground.
Perhaps the Member States even created, or conveniently did not 
resolve, the mistake that the Bologna Process was imposed by ‘Europe’, 
taken to mean the EU. In this line, Ravinet argues that the governmental 
players ‘manipulate the objectives and use them as leverage and justifi-
cation for reforms, even though they are not unilaterally obliged to imple-
ment these objectives’. She explains:
52 See, most notably, C Racké, ‘The Emergence of the Bologna Process: Pan-European in-
stead of EU Governance’ in D de Bièvre & C Neuhold (eds), The Dynamics of Changing Modes 
of Governance in Europe,(Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham  2007) and P. Ravinet (n 45).
53 A Moravcsik, ‘Why the European Union Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and 
International Cooperation’ (1994) Centre for European Studies Working Paper Series no 52, 
Harvard University 1.
54 Kahn (n 48) 4.
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The Bologna Process seems to have an element of juridicity (Pitseys 
2004), in that it appears to be legally binding in nature, especially 
when participating countries misinterpret their commitments as 
requiring conformity to superior and legally binding European poli-
cies. This lack of clarity can be used as a means to legitimise natio-
nal reforms. This misconception is reinforced when Bologna declara-
tions and communiqués are presented as texts of quasi-legal value, 
even though initially the Bologna Process did not have any official 
legal status.55 
In addition, several authors also argue that the use of the knowledge-eco-
nomy rhetoric has contributed to the increasing sense of ‘being bound’ 
to the Bologna objectives by the signatories themselves. Ravinet argues 
convincingly that the overlap between the Bologna objectives and those 
of the EC is, to a certain extent, ‘where they derive their authority and 
importance from, at least partly explaining why their use contributes so 
much to a sense of bindingness’. 56 Fejes concurs, stating that:
planetspeak rhetoric such as the ideas of the knowledge society, em-
ployability, lifelong learning, quality assurance and mobility […] con-
stitute a way of thinking that makes participation in the Bologna pro-
cess and the implementation of its objectives a rational way to act.57 
In that sense, one can say that the Process has begun to lead its own 
life, once the ‘soft’ and flexible product of informal intergovernmental co-
operation, now turning into something that ‘needs to be done’ without 
anyone knowing exactly why, or having different reasons to think so. This 
partly explains the surprising force of this voluntary project of policy con-
vergence. All the actors appear to have their own objectives, which can be 
located in some common rhetoric and therewith a powerful platform for 
action is created. As Corbett puts it: 
governments want to use Europe to introduce domestic reform. The 
Commission wishes to extend its competence in higher education. 
University presidents want recognition. They each bring elements of 
the solution, as embodied in Bologna.58
A critical attitude is warranted here. If European-level action is re-
sorted to in order to avoid national public scrutiny, severe problems with 
the democratic legitimacy of the project arise. Such concerns have pla-
55 Ravinet (n 45) 353.
56 Ravinet (n 45) 357.
57 A Fejes, ‘The Bologna Process: Governing Higher Education in Europe through Stan-
dardization’ (paper presented at the third conference on Knowledge and Politics – the Bolo-
gna Process and the Shaping of the Future Knowledge Societies, 2005) 219. 
58 A Corbett, ‘Europeanisation and the Bologna Process: A Preliminary to a British Study 
(paper presented to the one day conference co-sponsored by the ESRC and UACES, 2004) 12.
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gued the EU for a long time, and to a certain extent rightly so. The que-
stion of whether the EU should possess, exercise and seek to expand its 
powers in higher education is an important one, and its answer closely 
relates to these legitimacy questions. But instead of this being a valid ar-
gument for the governments of the Member States to embark on the Bo-
logna Process without and outside the EU institutions, it is an argument 
why it is even more worrisome that they have done so. The EU, for all its 
democratic defects, is still more democratic than the intergovernmen-
tal smoke-filled rooms in which the Sorbonne and Bologna Declarations 
came into existence. The Sorbonne Declaration, where the essential ide-
as were born and introduced, was the product of the birthday party of 
a prestigious university celebrated by a select group of ministers among 
themselves. The subsequent Bologna Declaration was signed at an elite 
party, as an intergovernmental piece of soft law but with far-reaching 
ambitions, without any recourse to the institutional framework of the EU, 
thereby avoiding its built-in safeguards, checks and balances. There was 
hardly any parliamentary involvement, barely any public consultation, 
and most reforms were rushed through in only a few years. Although the 
governments proudly speak of the bottom-up approach of the Bologna 
Process, meaning that the state is in full control as opposed to suprana-
tional rule-making, many opine that the changes of the Bologna Process 
were imposed on the actors in the field in a top-down manner with little 
or no opportunity of debate.59 
Indeed, this is one of the reasons why it has been argued that the 
Bologna Process, if deemed necessary for the future of European higher 
education, should have been created within an EU context, preferably in 
the form of a Bologna Directive.60 This argument, however, is only really 
forceful if one contrasts the Bologna Process with EU hard law, adopted 
through the Community method. It is, in fact, only in that case that it 
can convincingly be claimed that the decision-making mechanisms gu-
arantee a certain level of democracy and legitimacy and that the rule of 
law is upheld, not least by the fact that individuals, such as students, 
have recourse to the European Court. The ever-increasing powers of the 
European Parliament should compensate for the loss of parliamentary 
control at the national level, a loss that is partly inherent in international 
law/policy making. From this point of view, therefore, the increasing use 
of soft law in the EU, such as the OMC, can be considered as worrisome 
as the public international soft law making of the Bologna Process outsi-
de the EU’s institutional framework. As Trubek, Cottrell and Nance note, 
recent years have indeed seen significant criticism on the use of soft law 
in the EU, the objections including that soft law lacks the clarity and 
59 Lonbay (n 6) 253. 
60 See S Garben, ‘The Bologna Process: From a European Law Perspective’ (2010) 16 (2) 
European Law Journal 186–210.
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precision needed to provide predictability and a reliable framework for 
action and that it by-passes normal systems of accountability.61 Althou-
gh soft law appears to be less intrusive to national autonomy, and thus 
more respectful of national preferences and diversity, it, in fact, proves 
to be a treacherously powerful policy source. More than being a relatively 
unchecked and unlimited method of policy making, its power actually 
lies in the fact that it is unchecked and unlimited. This is an important 
finding, for it lays bare its doubtful legitimacy, as well as the underlying 
problem that apparently what politicians strive to achieve does not con-
cur with what their constituencies believe. This gap between citizens and 
their governors has often been discussed both in an EU and national 
context. The debacle of the European Constitution is an obvious point of 
reference in this regard. 
Europeanisation equals economisation?
The undemocratic nature of the education reforms of the past deca-
de finds illustration in the persistent protests and demonstrations taking 
place all over Europe. Students and teachers, the intended beneficiaries 
of increased intra-European mobility, seem to have turned en masse aga-
inst the recent surge of Europeanisation of higher education.62 Although 
61 D Trubek, P Cottrell & M Nance, ‘“Soft Law”, “Hard Law” and EU Integration’ in G de 
Burca & J Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2006) 66. 
62 In 2005, French students protested against the Bologna reforms, causing the University 
of Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis to temporarily shut its doors. See Jane Marshall Paris, 
‘French protest over Bologna’ Times Higher Education (29 April 2005). In 2006, Swedish 
students protested against the proposal to cut PhD terms. See C Schubert, ‘Swedish stu-
dents protest proposal to cut PhD terms’ (2006) 12 Nature Medicine 373. In 2008, nume-
rous protests directed specifically at the Bologna Process, as well as the ‘commercialisation 
of higher education’ in general took place all over Europe, but mostly in Spain. On 7 May 
2008, close to 5,000 students protested against the Bologna Process in Zagreb. On 19 
June student representatives in Austria protested against further restrictions to take a 
master’s degree, part of the reforms introduced by the Austrian government in relation to 
the Bologna Process. On 8 May, more than 10,000 students and teachers protested against 
the Bologna Process in Barcelona, after they had already done so in a huge demonstration 
with 10,000 participants in Barcelona and more than 3,000 in Sevilla on 6 March 2008. In 
Grenada, 150 protesting students occupied a faculty on 24 April. Protests also took place 
in Madrid where students blocked roads. On 22 October protests took place in 30 cities 
across Spain against the Bologna Process and in defence of public education. Protests were 
staged in Italy, where about 5,000 people assembled in Milan. Less than a month later, on 
20 November, thousands of students in several Spanish cities protested again against the 
Bologna Process. For an overview of all the protests that took place in 2008, see <http://
fading-hope.blog-city.com/students_protest_worldwide_against_commercialisation_ bologn.
htm> accessed on 30 November 2010. In 2009, the Spanish resistance continued. On 19 
March, students occupied the central building of the University of Barcelona in protest 
against Bologna, and teachers, parents, students, pupils and workers joined a demonstra-
tion involving 50,000 participants in the city centre demanding different education policies. 
On 10 February 2009, professors and researchers in France joined the protest against the 
Bologna reforms in the nation’s major cities. See M Garcia Gomez, ‘Education: Bologna 
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the protesting crowds are perhaps not always consistent in what they are 
protesting against, for sometimes it is the EU, sometimes the Bologna 
Process, and sometimes their national government, it might be possible 
to distil a common objection against many of the reforms that the edu-
cation sectors of the Member States have seen over the past years. The 
general sense seems to be that despite all the political high talk about 
how imperative education is for contemporary societies, the sector and 
its people are continuously subjected to cutbacks and downsizings, and 
increasing demands for economic efficiency. In that sense, it is probably 
more the economisation than the Europeanisation of higher education 
that is objected to, but there is some truth in conflating the two. The 
Bologna Process carries a distinct economic flavour, as does the educa-
tion policy of the EU. The former introduces the Anglo-Saxon model on 
the European continent, not only in terms of labels and structures, but 
arguably also in ideology. The latter has most often dealt with education 
from an economic perspective, and has most recently brought it into the 
Lisbon Strategy where Europe is to become the world’s most competitive 
knowledge economy, and the educational rights that have been granted 
seem to flow more from a labour market logic than anything else. This is 
a valid objection against increased EU involvement in education, as well 
as against the Bologna Process. As Karlsen argues:
The Bologna main objects ‘The European Education Area’ corres-
pond well to the ‘Internal Market’.  In particular higher education and 
knowledge are looked upon and treated more like economic commo-
dities inside a certain area. There is clearly a movement towards a 
marketization in the field of education (Schostak 1993). The dominant 
aims for the exchange and mobility of ‘human capital’ and knowledge 
are preparations for increasing competition on the global market place 
and preparation of students for the internationalized labour market. 
The cultivation of the individual (Bildung) is not absent, but primarily 
instrumental and not for its intrinsic values.63
Indeed, apart from the politically strategic aims that we have discu-
ssed above, the main reasons to embark on the structural harmonisation 
of the European higher education systems through the Bologna Process 
process, sales time in French universities’ <http://www.cafebabel.co.uk/article/28859/
bologna-process-education-protests-clermont.html> accessed on 30 November 2010. In 
July 2009, Cologne students expressed their criticisms of the Bologna Process. See J Fal-
lon, ‘Köln gegen Bologna: die deutschen Studenten formieren sich’, <http://www.cafebabel.
de/video/183/koeln-gegen-bologna-studenten-proteste-deutschland.html> accessed on 30 
November 2010. In October 2009, the city of Vienna witnessed massive protests against 
the Bologna reforms. See B Lang, ‘Studierendenproteste in Wien: Bologna stinkt!’ <http://
www.cafebabel.de/article/33754/studierendenproteste-in-wien-die-groe-ruhe-n.html> ac-
cessed on 30 November 2010.
63 G Karlsen, ‘The Bologna Process: A Judicial Confirmation of EU’s Policy of Education?’ 
(paper for the 3rd Conference of Knowledge and Politics at the University of Bergen 2005) 4.
227CYELP 6 [2010] 209-230
was to increase the competitiveness of Europe on an international scale. 
And the main purpose of the OMC in education is to fully exploit its po-
tential in the creation of a European knowledge based economy. More and 
more, the purpose of education in contemporary society is being phrased 
as an almost exclusively economic one. The economic benefits for both 
the individual and society at large are constantly stressed and argued as 
reasons for increased European-level co-operation. Although it is true 
that education is key to economic development and that potentially large 
gains are to be made by engaging in European-level co-operation in this 
area, it does reflect a dangerously one-sided perspective on education. 
One of the possible consequences of this development is that courses 
are increasingly designed to suit the needs of the market, rather than to 
instil students with knowledge for the sake of individual and academic 
progress. This means that the content of university studies might become 
tailored to the needs of prospective employers, who demand graduates 
that are fully operational from day one, turning university education into 
vocational training. This development might equally threaten the existen-
ce of less economically viable disciplines such as history, archaeology 
and philosophy to the benefit of law, economics and business studies. 
In addition, the Bologna Process, but also the European Commission, 
encourages the ‘autonomy’ of higher education institutions vis-à-vis their 
national governments. To a certain extent, this seems to explain the sur-
prisingly supportive attitude of higher education institutions towards the 
Bologna reforms. Autonomy could indeed be deemed desirable from an 
academic perspective, but its potential economic implications should not 
be underestimated. It might mean less ‘meddling’ from the government, 
but that usually also comes at the price of less government funding. This 
implies increased reliance on funding from other sources, such as the 
private sector, and although that might seem desirable from the viewpo-
int of saving public funds, it does raise concerns about the independence 
and objectivity of research and education. 
It is in the first place the Member States who prove so keen to ‘eco-
nomise’ higher education. They promote this approach in their capacity 
as Member States of the EU, most particularly via the Council and its Li-
sbon Strategy, and they do so outside the EU framework, most notably in 
the context of the Bologna Process. Nevertheless, the EU institutions also 
play their part. The European Commission seems so keen to fully exploit 
the responsibility and power that it has finally acquired in this field that 
it does not question the Member States in their policy decisions. It has 
never really objected to the undemocratic nature of the Bologna Process 
or the education OMC, and it faithfully plays its part in promoting closer 
ties between business and education, in promoting autonomy for higher 
education institutions and in arguing for efficiency and target-setting in 
education. Furthermore, the European Court almost limitlessly applies 
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the internal market freedoms to educational actors and their activities. 
This not only poses a legal problem in bypassing art 165(1) TFEU, but 
it also simply does not seem to respect the fact that, in education, con-
siderations that are not economic – and that might very well be at odds 
with economic efficiency – play an important role. Obviously, the Euro-
pean Court has applied a more nuanced approach, allowing restrictions 
of movement if objectively justified. But the national policies in question 
have to meet a rigorous and strictly applied proportionality test if they 
even only indirectly hinder a free single market. It is understandable 
that some, on principle, object to internal market logic being the general 
rule, with aims such as achieving a high quality of education being the 
exception. 
So, although it is the Member States who drive this process of eco-
nomisation much more than the European Court, the latter should, ne-
vertheless, think over its approach. From the foregoing perspective, Eu-
ropean citizenship, laid down in art 21 TFEU (ex art 18 EC), might be a 
better basis for the development of equal treatment rights for students 
than the four freedoms are. In this sense, it is worrying that the ECJ has 
confirmed that education can be qualified as a service. The next step 
could very well be to qualify students as recipients of those services. Re-
cently, Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in his Opinion in Morgan 
and Bucher indeed argued in favour of this interpretation of the service 
provisions. He argued that: 
obstacles to attending classes outside the country of origin, as well 
as limiting the range of options available to the students, have an 
effect on the educational establishment, by reducing their opportu-
nities for attracting foreign students. 
He went on to draw the expected analogy with health care, arguing that 
the Court had already held that 
the freedom to provide services includes the freedom for the recipi-
ents of services, including persons in need of medical treatment, to 
go to another Member State in order to receive those services there, 
and also paid medical care 
and that this reasoning had to be extended to the realm of higher educa-
tion. He stated that universities normally offer education in exchange for 
remuneration, in terms of registration charges or monthly instalments, 
so any obstacle to attending their classes had to be regarded as a restric-
tion on the freedom to provide services. 
The Opinion of the Advocate General was delivered in March 2007, 
and although the Court in its Morgan and Bucher judgment did not touch 
the issue, it implicitly gave a tentative answer in the Schwarz judgment 
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of September 2007. The Schwarz case concerned the refusal to grant tax 
relief on the ground that the private school in question was established 
in another Member State. The Court held that the German legislation 
impeded the possibility of taking advantage of offers of education emana-
ting from such a school, meaning that its freedom to provide services was 
impaired. It was, according to the ECJ, settled case law that ‘the freedom 
to provide services includes the freedom of the persons for whom the 
services are intended to go to another Member State, where the provider 
is, in order to enjoy the services there’.64 With the Schwarz judgment, the 
Court has already begun to transpose its approach in medical services to 
the area of education, and there is no particular reason to assume that 
the Court would not hold this reasoning to be applicable in the case of 
migrant students. Art 56 TFEU (ex art 49 EC) will then be the default ba-
sis upon which student claims are dealt with, as it takes precedence over 
art 21 TFEU.65 If the Court decides to go this way, it will probably have 
the effect of strengthening student claims to equal treatment, including 
maintenance grants, should the establishment in question operate as a 
private school. But, as Dougan has pointed out, this would 
have the effect of diverting Member State resources away from fi-
nancial support for public sector education (within the domestic 
territory) towards private sector establishments (in other countries) 
– amounting in effect to a form of Community-led contracting out-
cum-outsourcing.66 
This is certainly something for the Court to think about.
Conclusion
As we have discussed above, dealing with education matters with 
a fundamentally economically tainted view is not without consequence. 
Although there might be legitimate reasons to choose this approach, the 
point is that there should be an open discussion about this with the pub-
lic at large. Perhaps there is majority support for taking higher education 
in this direction, but it could also very well be that there is not. In this 
sense, it could be considered suspicious that the two developments that 
are responsible for most of the recent economisation of higher education 
over the past decades, to wit the Bologna Process and the Lisbon Strat-
egy, are both fundamentally undemocratic and unaccountable. Indeed, 
it would have been better to act within the EU legislative framework in-
64 Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377, paras 10 and 16, 
as cited by the ECJ in Case C-76/05 Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz v Finanzamt Bergisch 
Gladbach [2007] ECR I-6849, para 36.
65 Case C-92/01, Stylianakis [2003] ECR I-1291, para 18.
66 Dougan (n 6) 979.
230 Sacha Garben: The Bologna Process and the Lisbon Strategy...
stead, especially with regard to the Bologna Process. If anything, such a 
move would have triggered a Europe-wide debate about higher education 
and its purpose in European societies. The Commission could have taken 
its time to gather the necessary knowledge about Europe’s higher educa-
tion systems and to gather the views of the stakeholders and the general 
public. Not unimportantly, this course of action would have allowed the 
European Parliament to weigh in on the matter. It is indeed questionable 
whether in this scenario the Bologna Process, with its current content, 
would have come into existence at all. But rather than this constituting 
a good reason for the EU legislative framework to have been avoided, it 
seems that this put a finger right on Bologna’s unforgivable flaw: its un-
democratic nature. To the extent that it pushes the commercialisation of 
higher education, it does so through the back door.
Although “the weight of Europe”67 is deployed to push reforms in this 
direction, it is not Europe or Europeanisation per se that forces a neo-lib-
eral view on education affairs. It is also quite possible to aspire to a strong 
and unified Europe, without borders for educational mobility and with 
an active role in education policy, for non-economic reasons. Knowledge 
dissemination, cultural exchange, bundling of intellectual forces, achiev-
ing a better allocation of intellectual resources, creating centres of excel-
lence, honouring Europe’s intellectual heritage and many other reasons 
could support the case for a strong Europe in (higher) education affairs, 
without making this entirely contingent on an economic dimension. In 
fact, there can be fruitful interaction between the economic and the social 
goals. From this point of view, it is rather unfortunate that there is not 
a stronger legal basis for the development of a true European education 
policy. The absence of fully-fledged EU competence in this field compels 
EU institutions to approach education more indirectly and narrowly, via 
the internal market. Although it would therefore be desirable to amend 
art 165 TFEU, it is highly doubtful that the Member States would ever 
support such a development. On the record, they might argue that doing 
so would impinge too much on their educational autonomy, thereby play-
ing on the fears that the EU is out to Europeanise (and commercialise) 
higher education. Off the record, it seems that they do not object to the 
Europeanisation (and commercialisation) of higher education, but that 
they object to doing so by more accountable and democratic means.
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